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Abstract
The automobile Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) is hard to
design and implement due to its real time features and increasing
complexity. Some automobile RTOS standards are released aiming
at unifying the software architecture of vehicle systems. Most of the
standards are presented informally in natural languages, which may
lead to not only ambiguities in specifications but also difficulties
in conformance verification. This paper proposes a rewriting-based
approach for formalising the automobile RTOS standard. Taking
the OSEK/VDX standard as an example, an executional formal
semantics of the automobile RTOS kernel, which focuses on the
real time features, is defined usingK, a rewriting-based framework.
We also report some ambiguous definitions of the OSEK/VDX
standard, which we find in the process of formalisation. The K
semantics of the OSEK/VDX standard is applied to conformance
verification, which is used to check the conformance of not only
the automobile operating system kernel but the applications.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.1 [Programming Lan-
guages]: Formal Definitions and Theory; D.2.1 [Software Engi-
neering]: Requirements/Specifications
General Terms Verification, language
Keywords Formal semantics; conformance verification;K frame-
work; automobile RTOS
1. introduction
Vast arrays of applications are increasingly used in automobile
RTOSs to improve the functionality of the system. As a result, the
automobile RTOS becomes more complex to design and imple-
ment. Some automobile RTOS standards have been put forward,
with the purpose of improving the reusability of automobile appli-
cations and unifying the development process of software.
The automobile standards, such as OSEK/VDX [1], one of the
most widely used automobile RTOS standard, define standard in-
[Copyright notice will appear here once ’preprint’ option is removed.]
terfaces of operating system, network management and so on. The
automobile RTOS venders are required to achieve a certification
through some technical methods, such as conformance testing [2].
The basic idea of conformance testing is to test the properties of au-
tomobile RTOSs with a test suite, which is generally derived from
the standards. However, most of the standards are given in natural
languages, which may cause ambiguities [3]. The ambiguity may
mislead not only developers on the implementations but testing en-
gineers on the composition of test cases. Moreover, test cases may
not cover all possibilities of the test targets. All these facts lead to
the result of conformance testing incomplete. Conformance verifi-
cation [4] is another complementary approach, by which a specifi-
cation in natural language is first formalised, and an implementa-
tion is verified whether it satisfies certain properties with respect to
the formal specification.
Conformance verification is a kind of so-called formal method
[5], which is a mathematical technique for the specification, de-
velopment and verification of computer systems. For its accuracy
and unambiguity, formal method has been widely applied in many
areas, including embedded systems. IBM verified the power gates
[6], registers [7] and IBM Power7 microprocessor [8] formally to
guarantee the reliability of their products. Intel Core i7 processor
has been formally verified before being introduced to the market
[9]. Formal method has also been used to analyze and verify au-
tomobile RTOSs and applications. In [10], an approach was pro-
posed to verify the applications of automobile operating systems
by bounded model checking. In [11, 12], a formal model of an au-
tomobile RTOS is defined to generate test suite. In [13], an exe-
cutable formal semantics of a part of the OSEK/VDX-based au-
tomobile RTOS (OSEK/VDX RTOS for abbreviation) is defined
using K framework [14] for the model checking of user-defined
automobile applications. However, a common weak point of the
mentioned existing work is that they do not consider the real time
feature, which plays an important role in automobile RTOSs.
By extending the work [13], we propose in this paper a more
complete formal semantics of the OSEK/VDX standard with con-
sidering its real time feature, and apply the formal semantics in con-
formance verification of an industrial automobile operating system.
The formal semantics covers more features of the standard, such as
the multiple activation of tasks and the alarm mechanism (see Sec-
tion 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). In the process of formal analysis, we realise
some ambiguous description in the OSEK/VDX standard, and give
them formal definitions on the basis of our understandings and dis-
cussion with automobile electronical engineers. We show with a
concrete case study how the conformance verification is achieved
by the K semantics. In the case study, we detect some inconformi-
ties of an industrial operating system to the standards. After fixing
the inconformities, we verified the conformance of the operating
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system by LTL model checking with respect to some important
properties, such as starvation freedom.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are following:
1. An executable formal semantics of automobile RTOS kernel
based on OSEK/VDX standard is given. The formal semantics,
which is defined using K framework, not only specify the ex-
ecution rules of OSEK/VDX system services, but also take the
real time features into account.
2. Some ambiguous descriptions in the OSEK/VDX standard are
reported, and their corresponding formal semantics are defined.
3. A new approach to system analysis with the K semantics called
conformance verification is proposed. To demonstrate the use-
fulness of the approach, we conduct a case study on an indus-
trial RTOS to it.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a brief intro-
duction of the OSEK/VDX operating system is given. We analyze
the ambiguous definitions of the OSEK/VDX standard in Section
3. Section 4 gives a formal description of the standard. Then an in-
dustrial application is analysed and verified in section 5. Section 6
and section 7 discuss some related work and conclude this paper
respectively.
2. Key Conceptions in the OSEK/VDX standard
An OSEK/VDX RTOS is a multi-tasking system. This section
gives some necessary knowledge of the OSEK/VDX standard for a
better understanding of our work. Key conceptions in the standard
include task, resource, event, alarms, etc. Task is a basic concep-
tion in the standard, which is used to implement complex control
software. The execution of tasks is managed by a scheduler on the
basis of priority. Tasks can synchronise by the means of events and
resources. The real time features of OSEK/VDX RTOSs are im-
plemented by alarms instead of timers, which are usually used in
embedded operating systems. Figure 2 shows the relations of these
conceptions.
counter ꞉꞊ counter + n
Counter Alarm
ActivateTask( )
SetEvent( )
Al
AlarmTask
     Event
     ECC
       set                     wait
   event1            event2
Event
Schedule
ready queue
          
  priority
task1task2…
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         get                      release
          
         task1               task1
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Figure 1. Full preemptive scheduling
2.1 Task Scheduling
Scheduler plays an important role in OSEK/VDX RTOSs be-
cause it is used to control the execution of tasks. The scheduler
decides the next task to run on the basis of its priority with a cer-
tain scheduling policy. It is assumed to be fixed-priority [3] in that
each task should be assigned statically a priority.
Controlled by the scheduler, a task changes between different
states. There are two types of tasks, i.e. basic task and extended
task, specified in the OSEK/VDX standard. A basic task has three
states, i.e., ready, running and suspended. A suspended task is ac-
tivated to be in ready state, while a running task also can be pre-
empted to be ready. Once a ready task is able to be scheduled, the
scheduler allocates it a processor and the task starts running. After
finishing, a running task goes into suspended state. The extended
task has a special state called waiting to indicate the task is waiting
for some events. We omitted the state transitions of extended tasks
here because it is not the emphasis of the paper. Interested readers
are referred to [1] for the details.
The scheduler works with a certain scheduling policy. In the
standard, there are three scheduling policies specified, i.e., full pre-
emptive scheduling, non preemptive scheduling and mixed preemp-
tive scheduling.
By full preemptive scheduling, a running task needs to be
rescheduled when a task with a higher priority enters into the ready
queue. We summarise some occasions when a higher-priority task
preempts the running task.
• When a higher-priority task is activated by system services,
such as ActivateTask and ChainTask.
• When an extended task with a higher priority is waiting for
some event and the event is set by the system serviceSetEvent.
• When the running task releases its resource by the system
service ReleaseResource, and after releasing the resource its
current priority becomes lower than some ready task 1.
For non preemptive scheduling, rescheduling will not happen
unless the state of the running task is changed or a scheduler is
called explicitly. Full preemptive scheduling and non preemptive
scheduling can coexist in a system, resulting in a mixed preemptive
scheduling policy.
2.2 Alarm
Time management of the OSEK/VDX RTOS is achieved through
alarm mechanism. The alarm mechanism is implemented by alarms
and counters. A counter, measured by “ticks”, is used to record the
number of recurring sources sampled by sensors from the environ-
ment. An alarm is attached to a counter. When the counter reaches
a predefined value, the alarm expires and triggers a configured op-
eration. In this way, the real time features can be implemented by
alarms, such as periodic task or interrupt at regular intervals.
The counters and alarms are configured statically by a system.
A counter has three attributes.
• MAXALLOWEDVALUE: to specify the maximum value a
counter could be.
• TICKSPERBASE: to define the count of “ticks” required by a
counter unit.
• MINICYCLE: to represent the minimum time of ticks for a
cyclic alarm.
An alarm also has three attributes:
• COUNTER: to specify the counter to which the alarm is at-
tached.
• ACTION: to define the type of notification, such as activating a
task, setting an event or calling an alarm-callback routine.
• AUTOSTART: to represent if the alarm is started automatically
or not.
Figure 2 shows an example of counter and alarm. If counter c
reaches its maximum allowed value 65535, it returns to 0 next time.
The increment of the counter value is triggered every two “ticks”.
If counter c is attached to a cyclic alarm, the cycle time of the
alarm must not be less than 3 “ticks”. In the example, the counter
is configured to alarm a. When the alarm expires, it will activate
1 The priority of task changes dynamically because the OSEK/VDX RTOS
adopts priority ceiling protocol.
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1 COUNTER c {
2 MAXALLOWEDVALUE = 65535;
3 TICKPERBASE=2;
4 MINICYCLE=3;
5 };
6 ALARM a {
7 COUNTER=c;
8 ACTION=ACTIVATETASK{
9 TASK= t;
10 };
11 AUTOSTART=false;
12 };
Figure 2. An example of counter and alarm
some predefined task t. The alarm can not be started automatically
and must be set by system services to get started.
Two system services can be used to set alarms, i.e., SetRelAlarm
(ID, increment, cycle) and SetAbsAlarm(ID, start,
cycle). The parameters ID and cycle stand for the ID of alarm
to be set and its cycle time respectively. If the value of cycle is
non-zero, the alarm ID is cyclical. Otherwise, this alarm will expire
only once after having been set. In case of calling SetRelAlarm,
the alarm time is the sum of current time and the value of the
increment. The parameter start represents the absolute alarm
time without considering current time in SetAbsAlarm. The sys-
tem service CancelAlarm(ID) is used to cancel an alarm accord-
ing to the standard.
3. Ambiguities in the OSEK/VDX Standard
The OSEK/VDX standard aims at providing precise statements
to represent a uniform environment for efficient implementation of
automobile software. However, we found some ambiguous defini-
tions in the process of formalising them. In this section, we re-
port and discuss these ambiguities before giving them formal defi-
nitions.
3.1 Ambiguity in Multi-activation of Basic Tasks
According to the standard, there can be multiple requesting of
activating a basic task. The system is able to accept an activation
request for a task in the ready or running state in case of the
maximum number of activation requests having not been reached.
The maximum number of activation requests is assigned statically.
Ready
Running Running
Ready
Suspended Ready
Task T1
Task T2
Activation Request Termination
     Scheduler ?
Running or Ready?
Figure 3. Full preemptive scheduling
The standard specifies that “If the task is not suspended, the
activation request will only be recorded and performed later” [1].
However, it does not define the exact time when activation request
should be handled. Here comes a problem. When the task has been
terminated, should the system activate it again first or perform the
rescheduling first?
Figure 3 illustrates an example of multiple activation request.
Both task T1 and T2 are full preemptible and T1 has a higher
priority. Task T1 makes an activation request to itself in its running
state. It goes into suspended state after being terminated. If the
activation request is performed at this time, task T1 is transferred
to ready state, which triggers rescheduling. Task T1 starts to run
due to its higher priority. If rescheduling is performed before the
activation request, task T2 is rescheduled to running state. These
two cases may lead to different system behaviours.
3.2 Ambiguities in System Services about Alarm
We find ambiguities of two system services about alarm in the
OSEK/VDX standard, i.e., CancelAlarm and SetRelAlarm.
The system service CancelAlarm is called to cancel an alarm.
However, no more information can be found about it in the stan-
dard. There can be three understandings of cancelling an alarm
leading to different results.
• To delete the relation between alarm and its corresponding
counter.
• To set the value of alarm time and cycle time to an unreachable
number, such as a number larger than the MAXALLOWED-
VALUE.
• To delete the alarm from the list of working alarms according
to the explanation in [15].
In the first case, the relation can not be set again because the
standard does not provide any corresponding system services. In
the second case, the alarm needs to be checked every time when
the value of the counter is changed although it never expires. This
may impact on the execution efficiency. Compared with the first
two cases, the third one is more reasonable. Once CancelAlarm
is called, the corresponding alarm becomes invalid. But it can get
valid again after being set by other system services.
The system service SetRelAlarm is not clearly defined. Ac-
cording to the standard, its second parameter increment stands
for the value of relative alarm time. Namely, the alarm time is the
sum of current counter value and the increment value. However,
it is specified in the standard that “The behaviour of increment
equal to 0 is up to the implementation”. There are two possible in-
terpretations, i.e., the alarm expires immediately or the first alarm
is simply ignored. The second one may cause problems when the
third parameter of SetRelAlarm is 0. Details can be found in Sec-
tion 4.
3.3 ambiguous in scheduling policy
The OSEK/VDX standard definitively specifies some condi-
tions of triggering rescheduling [1]. When anyone of the condi-
tions occurs, rescheduling must be activated at once. However, it is
possible that some alarm expires after occurrence of the condition
but before the activation of rescheduling. It is unclear whether the
scheduler should be activated first or not. This may lead to different
scheduling results.
Considering a concrete example as shown in Figure 4, there are
three basic tasks, A, B, C and task C has the highest priority while the
priority of task A is the lowest. We assume that task A is currently
running and has just activated task B (line 28). At this time, the
alarm M expires. If scheduling is handled first, task B is rescheduled
to running state. Then task C will be activated. Because it has a
higher priority than B, task C will preempt B and start to run. If
alarm is handled first, rescheduling will be performed after task C
having been activated. Task B can not run before C terminates.
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1 Alarm M{
2 ACTIVATION=
3 ACTIVATETASK;{
4 TASK=C;}
5 ...
6 };
7 TASK A{
8 PRIORITY=1;
9 AUTOSTART=true;
10 SCHEDULE=FULL;
11 ...
12 };
13 TASK B{
14 PRIORITY=2;
15 AUTOSTART=false;
16 SCHEDULE=FULL;
17 ...
18 };
19 TASK C{
20 PRIORITY=3;
21 AUTOSTART=false;
22 SCHEDULE=FULL;
23 ...
24 };
25
26 TASK A{
27 ...
28 SetRelAlarm(M,1,0);
29 ActivateTask(B);
30 TerminateTask();
31 }
Figure 4. An example of application
4. Semantics of the OSEK/VDX Standard
The formal semantics of the standard usingK framework is pre-
sented in this section. The ambiguous definitions of the standard are
defined formally after analysing the source code of some certified
OSEK/VDX RTOSs developed by iSOFT Infrastructure Software
Co., Ltd. [16]. Before presenting the formal semantics, we intro-
duce K framework briefly and the major challenges faced when
formalising the standard.
4.1 K Framework and its underlying Rewriting Logic
K is a semantic definitional framework based on rewriting logic.
Rewriting logic [17] is a computational model for concurrency, dis-
tributed algorithms, programming languages, software and hard-
ware systems. It can also be regarded as a logic for executable
specification and analysis. Many languages and systems based on
rewriting logic are designed and implemented, such as CafeOBJ
[18], ELAN [19], Maude [20] andK, among which,K is one of the
state-of-the-art frameworks with features of simplicity, executabil-
ity, analysability, and scalability [21].
K framework is used to analyse the program languages based
on their formal semantics. The syntax of language is defined using
BNF ( Backus-Naur Form) in K. And the semantic definitions are
like operational semantics, which denote the transition rules of
the system. K framework integrates many capabilities of program
analysis. Given a syntax and a semantics of a language,K generates
a parser, an interpreter, a model checker through its Maude backend
and a deductive theorem prover by translating its semantics into
Coq definitions [22]. The parser and interpreter allow a program
to execute based on its semantics. Furthermore, the K can analyse
the program more comprehensively than compilers. For example,
the model checking capability helps the language designer to cover
all the non-deterministic behaviors of certain language through the
state-space exploration. The main advantages of K are:
• K supports modular definition of formal semantics and user-
defined data types.
• The formal semantics defined in K is executable, which pro-
vides not only a way to formally analyse programs but a way to
test the correctness of defined semantics.
• K framework has many backend formal tools for interpreting
programs, model checking and theorem proving.
K is built upon three main components, which are configuration,
computational rules and structural rules. The configuration is a
nested cell to present the static state of a program being executed.
The basic ingredient of a K definition is cell, which is labeled
and stands for a piece of information of a state. The K rules are
executed by changing the information of states stored in cells. Both
computational rules and structural rules areK rules. The difference
is that computational rules are counted as computational steps
while structural rules are to rearrange the structure of configuration.
These concepts will be illustrated in Section 4.3, where we show
how the OSEK/VDX standard is formalised in K.
4.2 Challenges of Formalising the OSEK/VDX Standard
Many formidable challenges have been encountered when for-
malising the OSEK/VDX standard. The key challenges in this work
are about the formalisation of real time features and interrupt.
The first challenge is the formalisation of real time features. In
an automobile operating system time management is an essential
part, which has a big influence on task scheduling. It is a key prob-
lem to depict real time features for the formal analysis of system
behaviors. Time is counted by a physical clock in a vehicle system,
which is hard to measure accurately in a laboratory environment.
Moreover, K does not provide any approach to the formalisation of
time, and as far as we survey there is no existing work on it.
The challenge of depicting time is to choose an appropriate
granularity. In the standard, the increment of a counter may be trig-
gered by a physical clock. The clock time elapses along with the
execution of code. Generally, in most of the automobile applica-
tions the execution time of an assembly instruction is in microsec-
ond level, while the alarm time is in millisecond. Principally, alarm
expiration may occur at any time when an assembly instruction is
executed. However, a statement is formalised as an atomic opera-
tion in K. Thus it is challenging work to formalise alarm expira-
tion in instruction level. Moreover, we are not concerned with the
implementation of system services, but instead just give there for-
mal semantics according to their informal descriptions in the stan-
dard. Namely, each system service is considered as an atomic op-
eration. The execution time of a system service, which depends on
the amount of its code, the resource occupancy and some other un-
known factors, is difficult to evaluate precisely. Meanwhile, we also
have to consider the execution time of the statements except system
services in tasks, which is another difficulty.
Another challenge is the case of interrupt. In the standard, it is
not clearly defined whether the execution of system services can
be interrupted or not. We find that some system services allow to
be interrupted while the other APIs disable the interrupts in its ex-
ecution in the implementation of a certified RTOS. It means that
interrupt can occur during the execution of system service. There-
fore, if the system service is considered as an atomic operation in
formalisation, some interrupt may be missed. Otherwise, we have
to formalise the concrete the implementation of system services.
However, how to implement the system service is out of the scope
of the standard. Another problem with interrupt is that an inter-
rupt service routine (ISR) may call system services. However, the
system services called by ISR are not allowed to be interrupted be-
cause the standard specifies that the interrupt can not be nested.
These system services should be treated particularly.
4.3 K Semantics of the OSEK/VDX Standard
The basic idea of formalisation in K is to represent the system
states as configurations and transitions as rewrite rules. In an OS-
EK/VDX RTOS, a system state consists of the information of tasks,
alarms, the scheduler and so on. In this work, we mainly consider
the transitions of states that are caused through the executions of
system services. These transitions are formalised as rewrite rules
by defining the semantics of their corresponding system services.
In our formalisation, we consider the execution of a system
service as atomic due to the fact that the standard is not concerned
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Figure 5. Overview of the Semantic configuration
with the implementation. As discussed in Section 4.2, we need to
give a reasonable execution time to each system service. We regard
a millisecond as a unit time and consider the execution time of
a system service is one unit time in our formal semantics. That
is because in general a system service consists of hundreds of
assembly instructions and executing an instruction spends several
microseconds. Also, in most automobile applications the alarm
time are configured in milliseconds. Treating system services as
atomic causes the problems mentioned in the second challenge. So
far, we have not taken the interrupt process into account and leave
it as a piece of future work.
In this section, we show the formal definitions of K configura-
tion of system state, K semantics of some typical system services
on scheduling and alarm mechanism, and the execution time of
tasks. We omit the details of the definition of system services on
events and resources because it is not the emphasis of this paper.
4.3.1 K Configuration of system state
A configuration in K consists of possibly nested cells. The
K configuration defined for the standard is composed of over 50
nested cells, describing necessary information of tasks, alarms, the
scheduler and so on. Figure 5 shows an overview of the config-
uration. The cell task is declared with multiplicity *, i.e., zero,
one, or more tasks can be configured. The cell k enclosed in task
is the computation cell to store the program to be executed. The
activatedTime keeps the number of task activation requests, and
its maximum number is stored in activationTime. In the alarm
cell, there is a nested cell action holding the system service, i.e.
ActivateTask or SetEvent, to be called by the alarm. The actedId
keeps the identifier of the task to be activated or the event to be set.
In the configuration, we define a cell sysCounter to represent a
counter. This cell includes some nested cells to store the informa-
tion of the counter, such as counter value in cValue, the alarms it
corresponding to in alarmList and the MAXALLOWEDVALUE
in maxvalue. The TICKSPERBASE is formalises to have the same
value with MAXALLOWEDVALUE. We omit its cell in our se-
mantics.
4.3.2 K semantics of system services on scheduling
There are several system services that can trigger scheduling as
mentioned in Section 2.1. We consider two typical system services
ActivateTask and ChainTask as examples here. The two system
services have different semantics on full preemptive tasks and non
preemptive tasks, which should be formally defined respectively.
The semantics on full preemptive tasks is shown in Figure 6.
There are six occasions when executing the system service
ActivateTask(T) leads to different results. The first rule [AC-
TIVATETASK] in Figure 6 formalises the semantics of one oc-
casion when the alarm expires. According to the standard, if
ActivateTask(T) is called, the state of task T is transferred from
suspended to ready as specified by the state cell of the second
task. In the cell, the horizontal line indicates a reduction. The cells
without horizontal lines are only read but do not change during the
reduction. For instance, the cell state represents the task that is
calling ActivateTask(T) is in running state. The system service
ActivateTask(T) is consumed after having been executed. It is
RULE ACTIVATETASK〈 〈ActivateTask(T );
.
...
〉
k
〈running〉state ...
〉
task〈
〈T 〉tid〈N〉tPriority〈 suspendedready 〉state...
〉
task
〈 L
add(T,N,L)
〉
readyTasks
〈AT 〉alarmTime
〈 .Set
SetItem(alarmed)SetItem(schedule)
〉signal〈〈
RV
(RV+Int 1)%Int(MAV+Int 1)
〉
cvalue
〈MAV 〉maxV alue
〉
counter
when ((RV + Int 1) == Int AT )
RULE CHAINTASK-MUL〈
T 〉tid 〈 runningsuspended 〉state
〈ChainTask(T );
.
...
〉
k
〈N1〉activationTime
〈
N2
N2 +Int 1
〉
activatedTime
...
〉
task
〈AT 〉alarmTime
〈
.Set
〉
signal〈〈
RV
(RV+Int 1)%Int(MAV+Int 1)
〉
cvalue
〈MAV 〉maxV alue
〉
counter
when N2 < Int N1 andBool ((RV + Int 1) < Int AT )
RULE MULTIACTIVATED〈
T 〉tid 〈N〉tPriority
〈
suspended
ready
〉
state〈
N1
N1−1
〉
activatedTime
...
〉
task〈
L
add(T,N,L)
〉
readyTasks
〈
.Set
SetItem(shedule)
〉
signal
when N1= / = Int 0
Figure 6. Main rewrite rules for scheduling
represented in cell k by the reduction from ActivateTask(T) to
“.”, which stands for empty or the unit computation. The “...” are
structural frames, which match the irrelevant portions of this cell.
Because task T gets ready, it is added to the corresponding queue of
ready tasks, which have the same priority N as T. This is specified
by the cell readyTasks, where term L is reduced to add(T, N,
L). L is a variable for the list of queues of ready tasks, and add(T,
N, L) returns a new list by adding I to the queue in L with the
priority N.
Executing the system service causes one-unit increment to the
counter value. The value of counter needs to begin from 0 after
it reaches it maximum allowed value, which is formalised by the
reduction from RV to (RV+Int 1)%Int (MAV+Int 1). RV and
(RV+Int 1)%Int (MAV+Int 1) are two terms to represent the
counter values before and after the system service is executed
respectively. MAV is a variable for the maximum allowed value of a
counter, and +Int, %Int are two built-in operators for addition and
modulo operations on integers.
Every time when the value of counter is changed, alarm ex-
piration needs to be checked. In this rule, AT in cell alarmTime
expresses the time when alarm expires. The expression RV +Int
1==Int AT following keyword when represents the condition of
alarm expiration. On reaching the expiration time, a signal called
alarmed is released. Meanwhile, the signal schedule is also re-
leased which represents that the scheduler needs to be triggered af-
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ter the execution of ActivateTask(T). The release of these two
signals is formalised by cell signal. The handling of these two
signals is to be introduced in Section 4.3.3.
The second rule in Figure 6 specifies the semantics of ChainTask
(T) in the case of multiple activation request. This system service
may cause the termination of the running task and the activation of
a task according to the OSEK/VDX standard. The rule is defined
for the case that the task to be activated is just the task in running
state. Namely, task T is requested to be multiply activated. Based
on the analysis in Section 3.1, there can be two possible methods
for handling the multiple activation request. In the second method,
i.e., performing the scheduling first, it is unclear when the acti-
vation should be performed resulting in multiple interpretations on
the activation time. In the first method, the activation time is clearly
specified. Therefore, we adopt the first method, which means that
no schedule signal is released, though the task T is terminated.
The rule has a condition N2<Int N1 meaning that the num-
ber of activation request of task should not exceed its maximum
value. When the condition is met and the alarm does not ex-
pire, the activation time is increased by one as represented in cell
activatedTime.
Rule [MULTIACTIVATED] formalises the handling of the ac-
tivation information in the case that a multi-activated task T with
priority N has transferred to suspended state. The state of task T
is transferred to ready as soon as it is terminated, which triggers
the schedule signal. Meanwhile, the activation time of this task
is decreased by one, i.e. the value of N1 decreases to N1-1 in cell
activatedTime.
RULE SETRELALARM〈
〈running〉state
〈SetRelAlarm(I,N1,N2);
.
...
〉
k
...
〉
task〈
〈I〉aid
〈 −
(N1 +Int RV ) %Int (MAV +Int 1)
〉
alarmTime〈 −
N2
〉
cycleTime
〈 −
true
〉
cyclicity
〈C〉aSysCounter...
〉
alarm〈
〈C〉cid
〈
RV
(RV +Int 1) %Int (MAV +Int 1)
〉
currentV alue
〈MAV 〉maxAllowedV alue...
〉
sysCounter〈
L
L ListItem(I)
〉
alarmList
〈
.Set
SetItem(alarmed)
〉
signal
when N2 = / = Int 0 andBool N1== Int 0
RULE CANCLEALARM〈
〈running〉state
〈CancelAlarm(I);
.
...
〉
k
...
〉
task〈
〈I〉aid
〈 −
(N1 +Int RV ) %Int (MAV +Int 1)
〉
alarmTime
...
〉
alarm〈
L
remove(I,L)
〉
alarmList
〈.Set〉signal
RULE TWO-SIGNALS〈SetItem(alarmed) SetItem(schedule)
SetItem(schedule)
〉
signal
〈L′〉alarmList〈
〈T 〉tid
〈
suspended
ready
〉
state
〈N〉tPriority...
〉
task
〈L:ListTaskPair
add(T,N,L)
〉readyTask〈RV 〉cV alue〈
〈I〉aid
〈
AT
AT +Int CT
〉
alarmTime
〈CT 〉cycleTime
〈ACTIV ATE〉action〈T 〉actedTaskId
〈task〉actedType〈true〉cyclicity...
〉
alarm
when (I in L’) andBool (AT==Int RV)
Figure 7. Main rewrite rules for alarm mechanism
4.3.3 K Semantics of Alarm
We formally define 12 rules for three system services on alarms
and another 4 rules to specify the handling of alarmed signal.
Figure 7 shows three typical rules of them.
The first rule [SETRELALARM] formalises one case of the sys-
tem service SetRelAlarm(I, N1, N2). According to the stan-
dard, this system service is to start alarm I and set its relative
alarm time as N1 and cycle time as N2. After the system service,
the alarm time should be N1+Int RV. Besides, if the alarm time
is greater than the maximum allowed value of the counter (MAV), it
is becomes the value modulo MAV+Int 1. Namely, the alarm time
is reduced to (N1+Int RV)%Int (MAV+Int 1) as represented in
cell alarmTime. When N1 is 0, we discussed two possible interpre-
tations of SetRelAlarm(I, N1, N2) in Section 3.2. By the sec-
ond interpretation, the first alarm is simply ignored. However, if the
value of N2 is 0 this alarm can never take effect because N2 being 0
means the alarm is not cyclic and just alarms once. In this sense, the
first interpretation is more reasonable. Therefore, we take the first
interpretation in our formal semantics, i.e. the alarm AlarmID ex-
pires immediately and alarmed signal is released, as represented
in cell signal of this rule. After the alarm I is set it is added to
current alarm list L, which is specified in cell alarmList.
The rule [CANCELALARM] specifies the execution of system
service CancelAlarm(I). We have discussed three possible un-
derstandings to cancel an alarm in Section 3.2 and concluded that
the third one is more reasonable. Therefore, we adopt the third un-
derstanding in our formalisation, that is, the alarm I is cancelled by
moving from the alarm list in cell alarmList.
Rule [TWO-SIGNALS] formalises a case of the handling of
signals. When both of the signal schedule and alarmed are
triggered at the same time, there are two possible handling ways
as discussed in Section 3.3. We first handle the signal alarmed
on the basis that alarm is considered as a kind of interrupt in
[3] and the priority of interrupts is the highest with respect to
the OSEK/VDX standard. In the rule, the condition specifies that
the signal is released by alarm I. The cell alarm shows that the
action of I is to activate task T. The formalisation of this action
is same as the one of system service ActivateTask(T). We omit
detailed explanations here. The cell cyclicity shows that alarm
I is cyclic. Thus its next alarm time becomes AT+CT as shown in
cell alarmTime. After the signal alarm is handled it is removed
from the cell signal.
4.3.4 Formalisation of the execution time of tasks
As mentioned in the first challenge in Section 4.2, we need to
take the execution time of the statements except system services in
tasks into account. Because our work mainly focuses on the real
time features, for simplicity we do not deal with the formal seman-
tics of these statements but formalise their execution time. System
services partition the statements in a task into several blocks. In-
stead of measuring each statement, we consider a block as a whole
to evaluate its execution time. For the reason that in our formalisa-
tion the execution time of a system service is considered as one unit
time, the execution time of a block is measured through the value
that results from dividing the amount of statements in the block by
the average amount of statements in system services.
In general, it is difficult to calculate the amount of statements in
a block due to the fact that there may be recursive function calls,
loops with uncertain times and so on. However, our survey shows
that only simple statements, such as assignments, if statements and
fixed-time loops and non-recursive function calls, are used in the
industrial implementations of a task. Therefore, we assume that
a block only consists of the above four kinds of statements. For
if statements, we further assume that each branch has the same
execution time and then the execution time of an if statement is
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equal to the one of its branches. For fixed-time loops and non-
recursive function calls, we calculate the amount of statements by
loop unrolling and function inlining.
In order to specify the execution time of a block, we introduce
a special statement in form of TimeInterval=N to replace the
block, where N stands for the execution time. The semantics of
this statement is to add N to the counter value. The new value of
counter has two possibilities, i.e., it exceeds alarm time or not.
If the counter value does not exceed the alarm time, N is directly
added to the counter value as shown in rule [TIMEINTERVAL2] of
Figure 8. To deal with the other case, we need to divide N into two
time intervals such that after the first time interval alarm happens
to expire. Namely the first time interval is equal to the alarm time
minus counter value. After the first time interval, we handle the
alarm and then treat the second time interval as an independent one
to deal with recursively. The handling of this case is formalised
by rule [TIMEINTERVAL1]. In this way, we guarantee that no
alarm expiration is missed during the execution of a block, which
complies with the fact that alarm may expire during the execution
of statements in a task.
RULE TIMEINTERVAL1〈
TimeInterval=N ;
TimeInterval=((N +Int RV )−Int AT ); ...
〉
k〈
〈A〉aid〈C〉aSysCounter〈AT 〉alarmTime...
〉
〈
〈C〉cid
〈
RV
AT %Int (MAV +Int 1)
〉
currentV alue
〈MAV 〉maxAllowedV alue...
〉
sysCounter
〈L〉alarmList
〈
.Set
SetItem(alarmed)
〉
signal
when (A in L) andBool ((RV + Int N) >= Int AT )
RULE TIMEINTERVAL2〈
TimeInterval=N ;
.
...
〉
k〈
〈A〉aid〈C〉aSysCounter〈AT 〉alarmTime...
〉
〈
〈C〉cid
〈
RV
AT %Int (MAV +Int 1)
〉
currentV alue
〈MAV 〉maxAllowedV alue...
〉
sysCounter
〈L〉alarmList
〈
.Set
〉
signal
when (A in L) andBool ((RV + Int N) < Int AT )
Figure 8. Main rules for the formalisation of execution time
5. Application to Conformance Verification
The K semantics can be used for system analysis in various
ways, such as model checking, state space exploration and test
case generation. The work [13] shows these applications with theK
semantics of the OSEK/VDX standard. In this section, we propose
another application to system analysis with the K semantics called
conformance verification and show a case study on it.
5.1 The Basic Idea of Conformance Verification
Automobile operating systems are required to conform to the
standard in order to get certified by the OSEK/VDX organi-
sation. The traditional technique for ensuring the conformance
is conformance testing. A conformance testing method named
MODISTARC [23] has been proposed for the OSEK/VDX RTOS.
The basic idea is to test the result of running an operating system
kernel with a given suites of test cases in a given environment. The
organisation certifies an operating system if it can pass the testing.
This method is practical but has some limitations due to the testing
technique. In addition, only system services in operating system
Verification & Testing Result Conformance Verification Result
verification testing conformance
of kernel
conformance
of app
pass pass
√ √
pass fail × √
fail pass × ×
fail fail
√ ×
×: inconformity √: conformity
Table 1. Relations between verification & testing result and con-
formance verification result
kernel are tested in the method while an automobile operating sys-
tem including its applications as a whole is supposed to conform to
the standard.
OSEK OS 
Specification
OIL Standard
Properties
OS kernel
Applications
Formal Semantics 
of OS kernel
run
K Framework
verify
verify
Verification 
result
output
test
Testing result
Conformance 
verification
Figure 9. The architecture of conformance verification approach
As a complementary approach, conformance verification is used
to check the conformance of not only the operating system ker-
nel but the applications. Figure 9 shows the architecture of the ap-
proach to conformance verification.
Firstly, we define the K semantics of the OSEK/VDX and OIL
standards [24]. The OIL is abbreviated for OSEK Implementation
Language, used to configure resources, tasks and some other ob-
jects in OSEK/VDX applications. Then we extract some proper-
ties from the standards and formalise them as LTL formulae [25].
These properties are supposed to be satisfied by any automobile op-
erating system. Given a concrete implementation, we identify from
the requirement the properties that should be satisfied by the ap-
plications. Next we verify the two kinds of properties by model
checking the applications with the K semantics of the OSEK/VDX
and OIL standards. And we test these properties by executing the
applications on the operating system kernel. Finally, we conclude
conformity or inconformity of operating system kernel and appli-
cations on the basis of the verification and testing result.
Under the assumption that the formal semantics is correct, we
obtain the relations between verification & testing result and con-
formance verification result as shown in Table 1. If the verification
result of a property is consistent (or inconsistent) with the testing
result, we can conclude the conformance (or unconformance) be-
tween the kernel and the standard with respect to the property. The
conformance of applications can be directly concluded by the veri-
fication result.
The approach is feasible to automobile systems though the con-
formance verification result relies on the properties of applications.
That is because the automobile system is a closed system in that no
applications are allowed to install after it is deployed. It suffices to
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verify the conformance based on properties of the existing applica-
tions in an automobile system.
5.2 Case Study
We conduct a case study on an industrial RTOS and show
how the conformance verification can be achieved by adopting an
application called EMS, which is built in the system.
5.2.1 Overview of EMS application
EMS is one of the most important applications in the automotive
operating system, which requires strict time constraints. It commu-
nicates with the operating system kernel by CAN (controller area
network) bus. Because we are concerned with the real time fea-
tures of the automobile system, we ignore the bus mechanism and
assume a direct communication between EMS and the kernel.
EMS consists of two parts, i.e., configuration and implemen-
tation. The configuration specifies the statical attributes of alarms,
tasks, events and so on. In EMS there are five preemptible tasks and
they can not be multiply activated. The sketch of their implementa-
tion is shown in Figure 10. Task SystemInit is set as an autostart
task in the configuration file 2. It sets three alarms which are used to
activate three tasks periodically. Task AL Task 10ms is responsible
for sampling A/D data and is activated with the period of 10 ms.
Task AL EMS Task 100ms is used to get the rotational speed of the
engine and is activated per 100 ms. Task AL EMS Task 10ms up-
dates the engine state and triggers the combustion process in four
cylinders every 10 ms. All the three tasks must be finished in a cer-
tain time. Otherwise they may be multiply activated, which violates
the configuration and hence results in unexpected behaviors.
This work mainly focuses on the real time features of the sys-
tem that rely on the execution time of not only system services
but other statements in tasks. As mentioned in Section 4.3.4, we
abstract the statements except system services as a special state-
ment in form of TimeInterval=N to express their execution time.
For instance, there are about 360 statements in the block of task
EMS Task 10ms after loop unrolling and function inlining, and the
average amount of statements per system service is 110. Therefore,
the execution time is 360/110, amount to 3 units time. We represent
it as TimeInterval=3 (line 16 in Figure 10).
5.2.2 Conformance Verification
We verify the conformance between the industrial RTOS and the
OSEK/VDX standard with respect to EMS. As depicted in Figure
9, we identify six properties from the standard and the application,
and then verify them with the K semantics of the standard. Two of
them are verified invalid but they pass the testing on the RTOS. By
the result we find two inconformities in the implementation.
The six properties used for conformance verification are listed
below. The first three are extracted from the standard and the other
three are extracted from the requirement of EMS.
• Deadlock Freedom (DF): The system never reach a state from
which no task can run.
• Mutual Exclusion (EX): At any moment, there is at most one
task in running state.
• Priority Inversion Freedom (PIF): If a task becomes ready and
its priority is higher than the one of the running task, it must
preempt the running task next step.
• Starvation Freedom (SF): The task that calls system service
WaitEvent(E) must have been or will be set event E .
2 We omit the configuration file of the application due to the space limita-
tion.
1 int a;
2 /*PRIORITY=3*/
3 TASK EMS_Adap_Task_10ms{
4 while(true){
5 WaitEvent(Adap_Event);
6 ClearEvent(Adap_Event);
7 }
8 TerminateTask();
9 };
10 /*PRIORITY=2*/
11 TASK EMS_Task_100ms{
12 TerminateTask();
13 };
14 /*PRIORITY=1*/
15 TASK EMS_Task_10ms{
16 TimeInterval = 3;
17 TerminateTask();
18 };
19 /*PRIORITY=0*/
20 TASK Task_10ms{
21 SetEvent(EMS_Adap_Task_10ms, Adap_Event);
22 TerminateTask();
23 };
24 /*PRIORITY=4
25 AUTOSTART=1*/
26 TASK SystemInit{
27 SetRelAlarm(AL_Task_10ms,6 , 10);
28 /*ActivateTask(Task_10ms)*/
29 SetRelAlarm(AL_EMS_Task_100ms, 7, 100);
30 /*ActivateTask(EMS_Task_100ms)*/
31 SetRelAlarm(AL_EMS_Task_10ms, 8, 10);
32 /*ActivateTask(EMS_Task_100ms)*/
33 ActivateTask(EMS_Adap_Task_10ms);
34 TerminateTask();
35 };
Figure 10. Sketch of EMS implementation part
• Periodic Execution (PE): A periodic task should be executed
once at its specified interval.
• Multiple-Activation Freedom (MAF): The task that is config-
ured to be one-shot activation must not be activated in its run-
ning or ready state.
We formalise the above six properties and verify them using the
built-in toolkit of K. For instance, deadlock freedom can be verified
by exploring the state space of EMS. The command used for the
verification is as follows:
krun EMS.osek --search-final
krun is a K command, used to execute a specified program,
e.g. EMS.osek, with the K semantics of the language. The option
--search-final of krun indicates to exploring all the possible
executions and returning final states. There are two possibilities
with final states, i.e. occurrence of deadlock or reaching the speci-
fied bound. However, in the task EMS Adapt Task 10ms there is an
infinite loop (line 4 in Figure 10), which leads to non-termination
of execution. We deal with it by setting a bound.
As another example, we consider the verification of the star-
vation freedom using LTL model checking in K. The automobile
operating system does not allow a task always being in waiting
state. In EMS, when task EMS Adap Task 10ms waits for some
events, at least one of the events it is waiting for must be set to
EMS Adap Task 10ms sometime. This property can be described
as the following LTL formula:
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Properties Types verification result
on K semantics
testing result
on OS kernel
DF Std × √
ME Std
√ √
PIF Std
√ √
SF Std
√ √
PE App
√ √
MAF App × √
1 Std: properties extracted from the OSEK/VDX standard.
2 App: properties extracted from EMS .
Table 2. Formal verification and test result
2(wait(Adap Event, EMS Adap Task 10ms)→3set(Adap Event, EMS Adap Task 10ms))
Here wait(Adap Event, EMS Adap Task 10ms) is a Boolean
function with parameters Adap Event and EMS Adap Task 10ms,
which returns true when task EMS Adap Task 10ms calls the sys-
tem service WaitEvent(Adap Event), and false otherwise. The
function set(Adap Event, EMS Adap Task 10ms) returns true
when the event Adap Event is set to EMS Adap Task 10ms.
The starvation freedom property can be verified through LTL
model checking in K [25] with the following command:
krun EMS.osek --ltlmc ltlformula
The option --ltlmc indicates that a specified program, e.g.
EMS.osek, is model checked with the LTL formula ltlformula.
A counterexample is returned when ltlformula fails to be veri-
fied.
5.2.3 Verification Result
Table 2 shows the verification and testing results of the six prop-
erties. The results of the properties DE and MAF are inconsistent
while those of other four properties are consistent. By Table 1 we
can conclude that the operating system kernel and EMS are uncon-
formant to the standard with respect to the properties DE and MAF.
We obtain two counterexamples when model checking the two
properties. The counterexample of DE deadlock occurs when the
value of counter is 16. In this time the alarm AL Task 10ms expires
and is expected to activate task Task 10ms. However, this task is
in ready state and can not be activated because it is configured as a
one-shot activation task. Hence the error occurs.
By analysing the implementation of EMS, We notice that the
task Task 10ms has the lowest priority but the shortest period. It
violates the general priority configuration criterion, that is, a shorter
period task has a higher priority. After adjusting the priorities of the
tasks in EMS under the criterion, the two properties are verified to
be valid. Because EMS with original priorities passes the test on
the kernel, there may be potential bugs in the kernel. A possible
approach to detecting these bugs is to compose test cases according
to the returned counterexamples and use them to test the kernel.
6. Related Work
Some efforts have been done to formally study the OSEK/VDX
standard. For example, in work [26] the standard is partially for-
malised in Promela and verified by model checker Spin. Because
the operating system kernel needs some environment models (ap-
plications) to run, they generate a bounded number of environment
models for formal analysis. However, they do not consider alarm
mechanism in their work. In work [27] and [28], a concrete auto-
mobile operating system based on the OSEK/VDX standard is for-
mally specified in CSP and verified by model checker PAT. Their
formalisations are built in the code level, and they mainly focus
on analysing the operating system instead of the standard. Another
work [29] presents an approach to verifying the OSEK/VDX appli-
cations based on bounded model checking. But they do not take real
time features of the system into account. All of the above works are
based on model checking technique, which is also supported by K
framework.
As for the formal analysis of real time features in automo-
bile RTOS, the work [30] presents an approach to formalising and
verifying the schedule table of an AUTOSAR-based RTOS using
Real-Time Maude [31]. AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System
Architecture) [32] is the latest automobile standard based on OS-
EK/VDX. Real-Time Maude is an extension of Maude, which is
also based on rewriting logic like K but supports formalisation of
real time features. This is the first work on analysing real time fea-
tures on automobile systems to our knowledge. Inspired by this
work, we achieve the formalisation of real time in K. Compared
with Real-Time Maude,K is more scalable to describe complicated
and large systems. For instance, there are several large-scale seman-
tics having been defined inK, like the semantics of C [33] and Java
[34].
As for the conformance verification of the OSEK/VDX RTOSs,
the work [12] proposes a method for systematically constructing
test cases by introducing a constraint specification language, called
OSEK CSL. They construct test cases automatically using model
checker NuSMV. Similarly, the work [35] presents an approach
to generating test cases by formalising the test requirement using
Promela and Z-notation. Together with the formal models, the test
cases can be generated by recording the search path in a tool
called TGT (test case generation tool). However, both of these two
works on conformance checking still relies on traditional testing
techniques and mainly focus on the test of system services.
7. Conclusion
This paper presented an executable formal semantics of the OS-
EK/VDX standard. The formalisation includes most of the key
components in the standard, such as task scheduling, event mech-
anism, resource management and in particular alarm mechanism.
We reported some ambiguities of the standard which are found in
the process of formalisation. We then defined a formal definition
to these ambiguous descriptions after systematical analysis. Based
on the formal semantics, we proposed an approach to verifying the
conformance to the OSEK/VDX standard of an automobile oper-
ating system. We finally conducted a case study with an industrial
automobile RTOS, which shows the effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
Compared with the work in [13], the formal semantics of OS-
EK/VDX RTOS presented in this paper becomes more completed
by including the real time features and clarifying some ambigu-
ities. However, some problems mentioned in Section 4.2 remain
challenging issues and should be solved before the proposed ap-
proach is applied to industry. For example, the interrupt is an es-
sential mechanism of the OSEK/VDX standard. But interrupt may
lead to state explosion during formal verification because it can oc-
cur almost at any time. In addition, we only considered the formal
semantics of system services in the implementation of tasks. We
also need to formalise the semantics of other statements in order to
verify the properties that are specific to the tasks. Thanks to the K
semantics of C, it can be achieved by integrating these two seman-
tics. However, it will introduce a new challenge, i.e. how to measure
the execution time of each statement in a reasonable manner, which
is one piece of our future work.
Another future work is to take the environment into consider-
ation. The automobile operating system usually needs to interact
with environment. For example, the system may need the engine
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temperature and the fuel load as parameters, which vary occasion-
ally. Without knowing their values, the formal semantics can not
be executed. One possible solution is symbolic execution, which
treats variables with uncertain values as symbols [36]. Fortunately,
symbolic execution is also supported in K framework [37].
A complete formal semantics of the OSEK/VDX standard is
an essential basis for conformance verification. Another necessity
is that we need to acquire all the applications and their execution
results in an automobile operating system. To achieve it we should
gain insight into not only the operating system kernel and standard
but the implementation of applications of the automobile system.
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